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A B S T R A C T
The usefulness of the CEO-to-employee pay ratio disclosure to investors is subject to signiﬁcant debate. Our
experiment examines participant responses to higher-than-industry and comparable-to-industry pay ratio dis-
closures in a company. A prior experiment by Kelly and Seow (2016) (hereafter KS) found that incrementally
disclosing a higher-than-industry pay ratio on top of higher-than-industry CEO pay had indirect negative eﬀects
on the company’s perceived investment potential, via negative perceptions about the fairness of the CEO pay and
workplace climate. We ﬁnd that the negative indirect eﬀects of pay ratio disclosures on perceived investment
potential in KS are replicable in our study, and for a less extreme comparable-to-industry pay ratio. We do not
ﬁnd evidence that the eﬀects of incremental pay ratio disclosure on investor perceptions are stronger when the
pay ratio is higher-than-industry than when it is comparable-to-industry. Our study suggests that the ability of
pay ratio disclosures to impact investor perceptions extends across a range of pay ratios.
1. Introduction
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently ﬁna-
lized the pay ratio disclosure rule under Section 953 (b) of the Dodd-
Frank Act, which stipulates that companies must disclose the pay of the
median employee and the ratio between the pay of the CEO and that of
the median employee (hereafter, pay ratio) with eﬀect from 2017 (SEC,
2015). However, the usefulness of pay ratio disclosures to investors is
subject to substantial debate (e.g., American Beneﬁts Council, 2012;
Trumka, 2010; Warren, 2010; Wartzman, 2011). Some argue that it is
not clear how pay ratio disclosures would be useful to investors because
“the ratio will inevitably vary widely across industries or businesses
without any relevance to the ﬁnancial performance of a company”
(American Beneﬁts Council, 2012). Therefore, to better understand the
usefulness of pay ratio disclosures to investors, it is important to ex-
amine how investors process pay ratio variations that reveal diﬀerent
degrees of pay inequity between the CEO and the median employee.
Kelly and Seow (2016) (hereafter KS) use an experiment with Sin-
gapore MBA students acting as investors and ﬁnd that incremental
higher-than-industry pay ratio disclosure (versus higher-than-industry
CEO pay disclosure only) has indirect negative eﬀects on perceived
investment potential through perceived CEO pay fairness and perceived
workplace climate.1 This research note extends KS by examining in-
vestor responses to pay ratio variations.2 Speciﬁcally, we test whether
the eﬀects in KS for a higher-than-industry pay ratio are also observable
for a less extreme comparable-to-industry pay ratio and whether the
eﬀects are stronger for a higher-than-industry pay ratio disclosure than
a comparable-to-industry pay ratio disclosure.3
We ﬁnd that incremental disclosure of pay ratio, regardless of
whether it is comparable-to-industry or higher-than-industry, has in-
direct negative eﬀects on perceived investment potential through per-
ceived workplace climate and perceived CEO pay fairness. We ﬁnd no
evidence to support our hypotheses that the eﬀects of incremental pay
ratio disclosure on investor perceptions are stronger when the pay ratio
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1 Using the full sample of participants, KS reports a signiﬁcant indirect negative eﬀect via perceived CEO pay fairness and an insigniﬁcant indirect negative eﬀect via perceived
workplace climate. However, using a smaller sample of participants who passed the manipulation checks, KS reports in their Footnote 22 a marginally signiﬁcant indirect negative eﬀect
via perceived CEO pay fairness and a signiﬁcant indirect negative eﬀect via perceived workplace climate. Regardless of the sample KS uses, the overall inference is that there are indirect
negative eﬀects on perceived investment potential from an incremental higher-than-industry pay ratio disclosure.
2 We set our experiment in a restaurant industry, diﬀerent from the semiconductor industry in KS to increase the likelihood that investors would respond to pay ratio variations as a
result of perceived CEO pay fairness and perceived workplace climate. The restaurant industry that we use presents a setting where rank and ﬁle employees have direct contact with
customers and personalized customer service is important for the business strategy, which may heighten the eﬀects of perceived CEO pay fairness and workplace climate.
3 We do not examine how participant perceptions are aﬀected by the disclosure of a lower-than-industry pay ratio.
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is higher-than-industry than when it is comparable-to-industry.
Given that companies care about the ramiﬁcations arising from
negative perceptions of investors and the public when pay ratio dis-
closures are made (Greene, 2014), our study suggest that pay ratio
disclosures could help restrain CEO pay by highlighting how much
more the CEO is paid relative to the average employee (Aguilar, 2013;
Menendez et al., 2014). Our results indicate that even disclosing a
comparable-to-industry pay ratio has similar negative eﬀects on in-
vestor perceptions as disclosing a higher-than-industry pay ratio, which
suggest that these negative eﬀects are driven by the comparison of the
CEO pay to the median employee pay, regardless of whether the pay
ratio is comparable-to-industry or higher-than-industry. Hence, the
need for companies to manage investor perceptions is not limited to
those disclosing pay ratios that are higher than industry norms, but
extends even to those disclosing pay ratios that are in line with industry
norms. Our ﬁndings complement the survey results in Larcker et al.
(2016) which suggest that actual pay ratios and CEO pay are much
higher than what the majority of their respondents believe them to be.
As such, even a comparable-to-industry pay ratio may still violate
people’s expectations of what would be fair and appropriate. The ne-
gative investor perceptions associated with pay ratio disclosure, even
when the pay ratio is comparable-to-industry, may discourage compa-
nies from continually increasing their CEO pay to keep up with industry
benchmarks of CEO pay.
We organize the rest of this research note in the following manner.
We ﬁrst discuss the hypotheses. We then describe the design of the
experiment, followed by the results. Lastly, our study’s ﬁndings and
limitations are discussed in the conclusion.
2. Theory and hypothesis development
We argue that incremental disclosure of pay ratio, whether it is
comparable-to-industry or higher-than-industry, would have indirect
negative eﬀects on perceived investment potential through both per-
ceived CEO pay fairness and perceived workplace climate. KS ﬁnds
support for similar hypotheses for incremental higher-than-industry pay
ratio disclosure. We further argue that these indirect negative eﬀects
are stronger under a higher-than-industry pay ratio than a comparable-
to-industry pay ratio. We develop our hypotheses, depicted in Fig. 1
Panel A, as follows.
First, Hypothesis 1a predicts that incremental disclosure of pay
ratio, whether it is comparable-to-industry or higher-than-industry,
negatively impacts perceived CEO pay fairness. Hypothesis 1a is based
on equity theory (Adams, 1965) and social norms that people hold
about fair allocation of resources (Elster, 1989; Kahneman et al., 1986).
Under equity theory, the fairness of a person’s pay is evaluated by
comparing that person’s pay outcomes and work inputs with those of
other persons, and a ratio of outcomes to inputs that is comparatively
larger than that of others is then deemed as unfair (Adams, 1965). Prior
research suggests people may perceive inequity when there is large
vertical pay dispersion between lower-level employees and higher-level
employees (e.g., Cowherd and Levine, 1992). A pay ratio that makes
salient that the CEO is paid substantially more than the median em-
ployee in the company may lead investors to perceive that the CEO is
receiving a higher ratio of outcomes to inputs than would be fair.
There is reason to believe that there may be a stronger negative
eﬀect on perceived CEO pay fairness when the pay ratio is higher-than-
industry than when it is comparable-to-industry (Hypothesis 1b).
People naturally expect a CEO to be better paid than a median em-
ployee because the CEO provides more inputs, and thus a pay diﬀer-
ential between the two is not necessarily perceived as unfair unless the
diﬀerential is large enough (Becker, 1961; Gupta et al., 2012). The
larger the pay diﬀerential, the greater the likelihood that the pay dif-
ferential would be unexpected and hence perceived as unfair. Prior
research indicates that fairness perceptions are inﬂuenced by external
comparisons of pay in an organization with pay in other organizations
(Shore et al., 2006). Thus, people may make an external comparison of
the pay diﬀerential in one organization with that of peer organizations
to benchmark their expectations. Investors may respond more nega-
tively to a higher-than-industry pay ratio disclosure than a comparable-
to-industry pay ratio disclosure because the former reveals a greater
pay disparity that is more likely to be out of line with investors’ ex-
pectations. However, the current public perception surrounding the pay
disparity between CEOs and average employees is very negative
(Larcker et al., 2016). In a survey of 1202 individuals across the U.S.,
Larcker et al. (2016) ﬁnd that 74% of respondents believe that CEO pay
relative to the average worker’s pay is inappropriate, and 62% believe
that CEO pay should be capped at a mean of 17.6 times of the average
worker’s pay, which is much lower than current pay multiples of about
210. As such, even a comparable-to-industry pay ratio disclosure
making salient that the CEO is paid multiples of what the median em-
ployee earns may be suﬃcient to trigger perceptions of inequity as long
as the pay ratio is higher than investors’ expectation of a fair pay
multiple.
Fig. 1. Panel A: Eﬀects of Incremental Disclosure of Pay Ratio on
Perceived Investment Potentiala. Panel B: Experimental conditions,
associated labels, and manipulationsb.
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Based on our discussion above, our ﬁrst set of hypotheses is as
follows.
Hypothesis 1. Incrementally disclosing a pay ratio, given CEO pay that
is already disclosed, (a) decreases investor perception of the fairness of
CEO pay and (b) this negative eﬀect is stronger when the pay ratio is
higher-than-industry than when it is comparable-to-industry.
Second, Hypothesis 2a predicts that incremental pay ratio dis-
closure, whether the pay ratio is comparable-to-industry or higher-
than-industry, negatively impacts perceived workplace climate. Poor
workplace climate arises when employees perceive inequity when they
contrast their pay outcomes and work inputs to those of others, in-
cluding others who are at higher hierarchical levels (Adams, 1965;
Carrell and Dittrich, 1978; Cowherd and Levine, 1992). H2a is based on
investors believing that rank-and-ﬁle employees perceive inequity
when the pay ratio makes salient a substantial pay diﬀerential between
their CEO and the median employee in their company.4 Similar to the
reasoning behind H1b, the negative eﬀect on perceived workplace cli-
mate may be stronger when the pay ratio is higher-than-industry than
when it is comparable-to-industry (Hypothesis 2b). Investors may ex-
pect employees to respond more negatively to a higher-than-industry
pay ratio disclosure than a comparable-to-industry pay ratio disclosure
because the former is more out of line with employees’ expectation of a
fair pay multiple based on an external comparison with pay diﬀerentials
in peer organizations (Becker, 1961; Shore et al., 2006). Our second set
of hypotheses is as follows.
Hypothesis 2. Incrementally disclosing a pay ratio, given CEO pay that
is already disclosed, (a) decreases investor perception of workplace
climate and (b) this negative eﬀect is stronger when the pay ratio is
higher-than-industry than when it is comparable-to-industry.
Tournament theory provides tension to H1a/b and H2a/b which
predict negative eﬀects of incremental pay ratio disclosure on perceived
CEO pay fairness and perceived workplace climate. A larger diﬀerential
between the pay of top executives and lower-level employees provides
more competitive incentives for the CEO and lower-level employees to
exert more eﬀort (Green and Stokey, 1983). Indeed, although Faleye
et al. (2013) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship between relative CEO-
employee pay and employee productivity (revenue per employee) for
the average ﬁrm, they ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive relationship for ﬁrms
where tournament incentives are likely to be more powerful (e.g., ﬁrms
with fewer and non-unionized employees).
KS predicts and ﬁnds positive eﬀects of perceived CEO pay fairness and
perceived workplace climate on perceived investment potential. The po-
sitive link between perceived CEO pay fairness and perceived investment
potential is based on investors shunning companies that violate fairness
norms and investors believing that customers will also shun such com-
panies (Gopalan, 2007; Trudel and Cotte, 2009). The positive link between
perceived workplace climate and perceived investment potential is based
on investors believing that poor workplace climate impairs the company’s
performance because of its negative impact on employee eﬀort and em-
ployee retention (Bloom and Michel, 2002; Cowherd and Levine, 1992;
Pritchard et al., 1972; Pfeﬀer and Langton, 1993; Shin et al., 2015; Wade
et al., 2006). Our study also ascertains whether we obtain the same results
Fig. 1. (continued)
4 Perceived CEO pay fairness in H1a and H1b refers to investors’ perceived CEO pay
fairness. Investors’ perceived workplace climate in H2a and H2b is based on investors
believing that workplace climate is a function of employees’ perceived CEO pay fairness.
By having investors’ perceived workplace climate as a mediator variable that is not tied to
investors’ perceived CEO pay fairness, we allow for the possibility that investors’ own
perceived CEO pay fairness may deviate from what these investors believe to be em-
ployees’ perceived CEO pay fairness.
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as in KS for these links between perceived CEO pay fairness/workplace
climate and perceived investment potential.
Finally, we predict negative indirect eﬀects of incremental pay ratio
disclosure, whether the pay ratio is comparable-to-industry or higher-
than-industry, on perceived investment potential via perceived CEO pay
fairness (Hypothesis 3a); and via perceived workplace climate
(Hypothesis 4a). Further, based on H1b and H2b which predict that the
negative eﬀects of incremental pay ratio disclosure on perceived CEO
pay fairness and perceived workplace climate are stronger when the
pay ratio is higher-than-industry than when it is comparable-to-in-
dustry, we also expect that the indirect negative eﬀects hypothesized in
H3a and H4a will be stronger when the pay ratio is higher-than-in-
dustry than when it is comparable-to-industry (Hypothesis 3b and
Hypothesis 4b, respectively).
Hypothesis 3. Incrementally disclosing a pay ratio, given CEO pay that
is already disclosed, (a) has an indirect negative eﬀect on investor
perception of a company’s investment potential through investor
perception of the fairness of CEO pay, and (b) this indirect negative
eﬀect is stronger when the pay ratio is higher-than-industry than when
it is comparable-to-industry.
Hypothesis 4. Incrementally disclosing a pay ratio, given CEO pay that
is already disclosed, (a) has an indirect negative eﬀect on investor
perception of a company’s investment potential through investor
perception of perceived workplace climate, and (b) this indirect
negative eﬀect is stronger when the pay ratio is higher-than-industry
than when it is comparable-to-industry.
3. Method
3.1. Design of experiment
Our experiment uses a 2 (comparable-to-industry versus higher-
than-industry CEO pay: CompCEO versus HighCEO) × 2 (pay ratio dis-
closure absent versus present: RATIOAbsent versus RATIOPresent) be-
tween-subjects design (see Fig. 1 Panel B).5 In the two CompCEO con-
ditions, the company’s CEO pay is comparable to its comparison group’s
mean CEO pay ($4,346,753 versus $4,216,350) and is noted as being at
the 55th percentile of its comparison group. In the two HighCEO con-
ditions, the company’s CEO pay is much higher than its comparison
group’s mean CEO pay ($7,365,124 versus $4,216,350) and is noted as
being at the 75th percentile. The company’s comparison group refers to
17 publicly-traded companies in the same industry.
The two RATIOAbsent conditions only disclose the company’s CEO pay
and its comparison group’s mean CEO pay, but do not disclose pay ratio.
The two RATIOPresent conditions additionally disclose the company’s pay
ratio and its comparison group’s mean pay ratio while holding constant
the associated CEO pay. Therefore, HighCEO-RATIOPresent is identical to
HighCEO-RATIOAbsent except that it additionally shows that the com-
pany’s pay ratio of 161.91 is larger than its comparison group’s mean pay
ratio of 95.55, and CompCEO-RATIOPresent is identical to CompCEO-
RATIOAbsent except that it additionally discloses the company’s pay ratio
of 95.55 as comparable to its comparison group’s mean pay ratio of 95.55.
In both HighCEO-RATIOPresent and CompCEO-RATIOPresent, given the
respective CEO pay and pay ratio, the company’s median employee pay is
derived as comparable to its comparison group’s mean median employee
pay at $45,490 versus $44,125.6 Thus, a higher-than-industry CEO pay,
and not a lower-than-industry median employee pay, contributes to the
higher-than-industry pay ratio in HighCEO-RATIOPresent. The comparable-
to-industry pay ratio in CompCEO-RATIOPresent is attributed to compar-
able-to-industry CEO pay and comparable-to-industry median employee
pay.
3.2. Experimental procedures
We use the same experimental procedures and the same experimental
instrument (with adaptations for the diﬀerent industry) as in KS.7 Parti-
cipants are randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions. Each
participant sequentially completes a package of case materials with three
sections. Each section is in a separate envelope. Participants return each
section’s materials to its envelope before continuing to the next section.
Fig. 2 shows the order of experimental materials.
The ﬁrst section begins with asking participants to assume that they
work in the investment department of a ﬁrm. They are tasked with
assessing a company’s investment potential to help their ﬁrm make the
decision of whether to make a medium to long-term investment in the
company. Our design choice of not having participants assess the
company for their own investment purposes has been used by prior
studies and is aimed at reducing the likelihood of participants’ personal
investment preferences aﬀecting their judgment (e.g. Elliot et al.,
2012). The case states that the company is in the restaurant industry,
which is “a mature and labor-intensive” industry, and that the company
“owns and operates multiple chains of upscale casual dining restaurants
under diﬀerent brand names, with freshly prepared and innovative
food, ﬂavorful recipes with creative presentations, and personalized
service”. The case provides the company’s ﬁnancial data (e.g., revenues;
net income; working capital; property, plant, and equipment; long-term
debt) and a note disclosure on CEO compensation. All participants then
answer questions on the company’s investment potential.
The second section ﬁrst provides participants with the same in-
formation from Section 1 on the company’s ﬁnancial data and note
disclosure on CEO compensation. Then, questions are asked on parti-
cipants’ perceptions of the fairness of CEO compensation, rank-and-ﬁle
employee morale, rank-and-ﬁle employee job satisfaction, and rank-
Fig. 2. Order of experimental materials.
5 We replicate the ﬁrst three conditions (CompCEO-RATIOAbsent, HighCEO-
RATIOAbsent and HighCEO-RATIOPresent) from KS. We then add a fourth new condition
that discloses a comparable-to-industry pay ratio in addition to a comparable-to-industry
CEO pay (CompCEO-RATIOPresent).
6 The median employee pay in the restaurant industry is lower (Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 2010 median pay in the restaurant industry is $18,970). However, a post ex-
perimental question asks participants in HighCEO-RATIOPresent (mean = 1.12) and
CompCEO-RATIOPresent (mean = 0.96) (conditions wherein median employee pay in-
formation is provided) what they thought about the level of the median employee pay on
a scale of−7 (too high), 0 (just right), +7 (too low). There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in
perceived median employee pay level between these two conditions (two-tailed
p = 0.805), and our participants tend to perceive that the median employee pay is too
low (overall mean for the two conditions = 1.04 > 0, two-tailed p = 0.002). These
results suggest that setting the company’s median employee pay at $45,490 did not result
in our participants perceiving that the median employee pay is too high.
7 All ﬁnancial ﬁgures are the same as in KS (e.g. CEO compensation, median employee
pay, and the company’s ﬁnancial data except that we replace research and development
expenses with selling, general, and administrative expenses because of the diﬀerent in-
dustry).
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and-ﬁle employee productivity.
The third section contains a post-experiment questionnaire with
manipulation checks, demographic questions, and a 5-item Equity
Sensitivity Instrument (Huseman et al., 1985), with no information
from the prior two sections.8 Participants indicate that they took about
an average of 15 minutes to complete the experiment.
3.3. Participants
We recruited 100 participants for the four experimental conditions
from the same Singapore MBA program as in KS.9 Singapore investors are
familiar with the issues surrounding pay ratio disclosures as they are
among the largest foreign investors in the U.S. stock markets and they
have similar concerns regarding pay disparity between CEOs and rank-
and-ﬁle employees (Feinsmith and Gokul-Srinath, 2011; Chan, 2013).
Participants complete the experiment during breaks in their class schedule
and receive SGD$25 for doing so.10 Participants report an average of 4.51
years of working experience and about 44% work in accounting and ﬁ-
nance-related ﬁelds (i.e., auditing, tax, accounting, ﬁnance, banking, or
investing). On a scale of 0 (“never”) to 14 (“with high frequency”), par-
ticipants indicate an average of 6.49 (s.d. = 3.35) when asked how fre-
quently they invest in the stock market. Investors do not need to have
expert skills or knowledge to understand the theoretical links between pay
ratio, perceived CEO pay fairness, perceived workplace climate, and in-
vestment potential. As such, we do not expect participants with more in-
vestment experience to respond diﬀerently from our hypotheses. They also
indicate an average of 7.17 (s.d. = 2.80) for their level of accounting
knowledge on a scale of 0 (“no accounting knowledge”) to 14 (“high
accounting knowledge”). The inferences from all our results are similar
when we control for these demographic variables in our analyses.
3.4. Dependent variables
The two mediating investor perceptions are participants’ perceived
CEO pay fairness and perceived workplace climate in the company. For
perceived workplace climate, we average a participant’s responses to
three questions on rank-and-ﬁle employee morale, rank-and-ﬁle em-
ployee job satisfaction, and rank-and-ﬁle employee productivity
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88).11 For our ultimate dependent variable of
perceived investment potential, we average a participant’s responses to
three questions on the attractiveness of the stock as a medium to long-
term investment, the stock’s potential for price appreciation over the
next three years, and the company’s earnings potential over the next
three years (Kelly et al., 2012) (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.83). We use −7
to +7 scales for all questions used to capture investor perceptions.12
4. Results
4.1. Manipulation checks
We verify our manipulation of comparable-to-industry versus higher-
than-industry CEO pay by checking if participants correctly indicate that the
CEO pay is “about the same as its comparison group” in the two CompCEO
conditions, or that it is “a lot higher than its comparison group” in the two
HighCEO conditions. 93 of 100 participants responded correctly with no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in incorrect responses across the four conditions (Wald
χ2=1.57, two-tailed p=0.667).13 With respect to the pay ratio disclosure
absent/present manipulation check, 83 of 100 participants correctly indicate
that the pay ratio is not provided in the two RATIOAbsent conditions, or that it
is “a lot higher than its comparison group” in HighCEO-RATIOPresent, or that
it is “about the same as its comparison group” in CompCEO-RATIOPresent.
There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in incorrect responses for this question
across the four conditions (Wald χ2=5.31, two-tailed p=0.151).
We exclude from our tests of hypotheses participants who failed the
manipulation check on whether the CEO pay is higher-than-industry or
comparable-to-industry, and the manipulation check on whether the pay
ratio is not provided, higher-than-industry, or comparable-to-industry.
Including participants who fail the manipulation checks leads to largely
similar inferences from our results (i.e., signiﬁcant results stay signiﬁcant
and insigniﬁcant results stay insigniﬁcant), with one exception which we
highlight in Footnote 18 in the “Hypotheses Tests” sub-section.
Table 1
Means (standard deviations) of participant perceptions.
Conditiona N CEO pay
fairnessb
(s.d.)
Workplace
climatec (s.d.)
Investment
potentiald (s.d.)
CompCEO-RATIOAbsent 19 0.95 (2.93) 2.07 (2.26) 3.04 (1.99)
CompCEO-RATIOPresent 22 −1.14 (2.88) 0.38 (2.80) 3.30 (1.71)
HighCEO-RATIOAbsent 18 −0.50 (3.52) 1.72 (2.82) 3.67 (2.18)
HighCEO-RATIOPresent 22 −1.82 (2.65) 1.02 (2.12) 3.03 (1.74)
a RATIOAbsent (RATIOPresent) conditions disclose the CEO pay (CEO pay, median
employee pay, and pay ratio of those two amounts). The company’s pay ratio of 161.91
(95.55) in HighCEO-RATIOPresent (CompCEO-RATIOPresent) is higher than (comparable
to) the comparison group’s pay ratio of 95.55. The comparison group comprises com-
panies in the same industry. The company’s CEO pay is at the 55th (75th) percentile of its
comparison group and the amount of $4,346,753 ($7,365,124) is comparable to (higher
than) the comparison group’s amount of $4,216,350 in the CompCEO (HighCEO) condi-
tions. The company’s median employee pay is automatically set at $45,490 and is com-
parable to the comparison group’s amount of $44,125 in both RATIOPresent conditions.
b Participants rate the fairness of the CEO compensation (on a scale of −7 to 7).
c Workplace climate is the average of responses to three questions on participant
perceptions of rank-and-ﬁle employee morale, rank-and-ﬁle employee job satisfaction,
and rank-and-ﬁle employee productivity (on scales of −7 to 7). One observation is
missing from the CompCEO-RATIOAbsent condition, and another is missing from the
HighCEO-RATIOPresent condition.
d Investment potential is the average of responses to three questions on the stock’s
attractiveness as a medium to long-term investment, potential for stock price apprecia-
tion, and the company’s earnings potential (on scales of −7 to 7).
8 The equity sensitivity measure sums the values a participant assigns to each of the
ﬁve items and it can theoretically range between 0 and 50, with a larger value indicating
that an individual prefers his/her outcome to be more than his/her input to a greater
degree (Huseman et al., 1985). Our participants have an average equity sensitivity of
23.48 (s.d. = 6.99), similar to the equity sensitivities found in some U.S. samples (e.g.,
Mueller and Clarke, 1998). Equity sensitivity does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly across condi-
tions (F= 0.32, two-tailed p= 0.811), and the inferences from all our results are similar
when we control for equity sensitivity in our analyses.
9 The authors were not instructors of the participants. The experiment has received the
applicable university ethics approval.
10 The exchange rate was approximately SGD$1.40: USD$1 during the data collection.
11 To shorten the experimental instrument, we do not ask two additional questions on
quality of teamwork among rank-and-ﬁle employees and quality of relationship between
rank-and-ﬁle employees and top management that were in KS’s workplace climate vari-
able. We obtain data from KS and rerun their analyses using a workplace climate variable
that comprises only the three questions used in our study, and the inferences from the
results are similar to those reported in KS that used the workplace climate variable with
ﬁve questions. As such, using either three questions or ﬁve questions in the workplace
climate variable appears to capture the same underlying construct.
12 We conduct a factor analysis of all the investor perception questions (three questions
on investment potential, three questions on workplace climate, and one question on CEO
pay fairness) and two factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 emerged. The three ques-
tions on investment potential loaded on one factor with absolute loadings greater than
0.73. The three questions on workplace climate loaded on the other factor with absolute
loadings greater than 0.69. The question on CEO pay fairness does not load on either
factor, with absolute loadings of 0.29 on the investment potential factor and 0.18 on the
workplace climate factor. These results indicate that we have captured three distinct
constructs and support averaging the three questions on investment potential and the
three questions on workplace climate. Our hypotheses tests yield similar inferences when
we use factor scores rather than average responses (for the three items in each variable) to
represent workplace climate and investment potential
13 We also check if participants correctly indicate that the median employee pay is not
provided in the two RATIOAbsent conditions, or that it is “more or less the same as its
comparison group” in the two RATIOPresent conditions. 89 of 100 participants responded
correctly with no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in incorrect responses across the four conditions
(Wald χ2 = 2.46, two-tailed p= 0.482).
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4.2. Hypotheses tests
We report the descriptive statistics for the perceptions of CEO pay
fairness, workplace climate, and investment potential for participants
who pass the manipulation checks in Table 1. There are no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in perceived investment potential between HighCEO-RA-
TIOPresent and HighCEO-RATIOAbsent (3.03 versus 3.67, t =−1.06,
one-tailed p = 0.147), and between CompCEO-RATIOPresent and
CompCEO-RATIOAbsent (3.30 versus 3.04, t = 0.44, two-tailed
p = 0.664, opposite direction to expectation).14
Given that our hypotheses predict that both the direct and indirect
eﬀects of incremental pay ratio disclosure are moderated by whether
the pay ratio is higher-than-industry or comparable-to-industry, we ﬁrst
conduct tests of moderated mediation use the bootstrapping method
and the Sobel test (Hayes, 2013; Preacher et al., 2007).15,16 The boot-
strapping method uses 5000 bootstrap samples to calculate a 95% bias-
corrected conﬁdence interval for an indirect eﬀect, which is deemed as
signiﬁcant if zero is not within the bootstrap conﬁdence intervals. The
results for the moderated mediation model are reported in Table 2.
For Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 2b, Table 2, Panel A indicates that
both the interaction eﬀects between the moderator variable and pay ratio
disclosure (both two-tailed p values > 0.415) are not signiﬁcant in the
regressions used to generate the Path a1 and Path a2 coeﬃcients for the
Table 2
Moderated Mediation Analyses (Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes Approach) for Pay Ratio Disclosure with Higher-than-Industry CEO Pay as Moderatora (N = 79b).
Panel A: Regressions of the eﬀect of pay ratio disclosure (versus no pay ratio disclosure) on each mediator (Path a1 and Path a2)
Dependent Variable Predicted sign Coeﬃcient estimate t pc 95% lower conﬁdence interval 95% upper conﬁdence interval
CEO pay fairness
Intercept 0.94 1.35 0.181 −0.45 2.34
Pay ratio (vs no pay ratio)e H1a: − −2.08 −2.21 0.015* −3.96 −0.20
Higher-than-industry (vs comparable-to-industry) CEO
paye
– −1.44 −1.46 0.148 −3.41 0.52
Pay ratio x Higher-than-industry CEO pay H1b: − 1.01 0.75 0.454d −1.66 3.68
R2 = 9.50%
Workplace climate
Intercept 2.02 3.40 0.001 0.83 3.20
Pay ratio (vs no pay ratio)e H2a: − −1.64 −2.05 0.022* −3.24 −0.04
Higher-than-industry (vs comparable-to-industry) CEO
paye
– −0.30 −0.35 0.725 −1.97 1.38
Pay ratio x Higher-than-industry CEO pay H2b: − 0.93 0.82 0.415d −1.34 3.20
R2 = 6.38%
Panel B: Regression of the eﬀects of mediators on perceived investment potential (Path b1 and Path b2).
Mediators as independent variables Predicted sign Coeﬃcient estimate t pc 95% lower conﬁdence
interval
95% upper conﬁdence interval
Intercept 2.54 5.67 <0.001 1.65 3.43
CEO pay fairness + (per KS) 0.16 2.34. 0.011* 0.02 0.30
Workplace climate + (per KS) 0.21 2.61 0.005* 0.05 0.38
Pay ratio (vs no pay ratio Path c’ 0.87 1.48 0.144 −0.30 2.04
Higher-than-industry (vs comparable-to-industry) CEO
pay
Path c’ 0.84 1.42 0.161 −0.34 2.03
Pay ratio x Higher-than-industry CEO pay – −1.08 −1.35 0.180 −2.68 0.51
R2 = 17.55%
Panel C: Index of moderated mediation testing if indirect eﬀects of pay ratio disclosure (versus no pay ratio disclosure) on perceived investment potential (Path a1*Path b1 and Path
a2*Path b2) is moderated by higher-than-industry (versus comparable-to-industry) CEO pay
Mediator Index Boot SE 95% lower conﬁdence intervalf 95% upper conﬁdence intervalf
H3b: CEO pay fairness 0.16 0.24 −0.19 0.89
H4b: Workplace climate 0.20 0.26 −0.19 0.92
a See Table 1 for deﬁnitions of participant perception variables (perceived CEO pay fairness, workplace climate, and investment potential).
b Of the 81 observations that passed the two manipulation checks, two are dropped from the moderated mediation analysis because there are missing values for the perceived
workplace climate variable.
c All p-values are one-tailed for hypothesized relationships and indicated with *. All other p values are two-tailed.
d Two-tailed p-values are presented when the direction of the eﬀects is contrary to that hypothesized.
e The pay ratio variable is coded “1” for RATIOPresent and “0” for RATIOAbsent. The higher-than-industry CEO pay variable is coded “1” for HighCEO and “0” for CompCEO.
f Percentile bootstrap conﬁdence intervals are based on 5000 bootstrap samples.
14 Although our independent variable of pay ratio disclosure does not have a sig-
niﬁcant overall eﬀect on the dependent variable of perceived investment potential, recent
research on mediation analyses notes that this does not preclude indirect eﬀects of pay
ratio disclosure on perceived investment potential via mediators (Kenny et al., 1998;
Shrout and Bolger, 2002; MacKinnon et al., 2007). The overall eﬀect of pay ratio dis-
closure on perceived investment potential is the “sum of many diﬀerent paths of inﬂu-
ence, direct and indirect, not all of which may be part of a formal model” (Hayes, 2009, p.
414). There may be counteracting positive eﬀects of pay ratio disclosure on perceived
investment potential that our study does not examine.
15 The Sobel test assumes a normal sampling distribution for the indirect eﬀect,
whereas the bootstrap conﬁdence intervals test approximates the sampling distribution of
the indirect eﬀect using bootstrap samples and it may have more power than the Sobel
test (Hayes, 2013).
16 By design, the higher-than-industry pay ratio is driven by a higher-than-industry
CEO pay (coupled with a comparable-to-industry median employee pay) and the com-
parable-to-industry pay ratio is driven by a comparable-to-industry CEO pay (coupled
with a comparable-to-industry median employee pay).
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eﬀects of pay ratio disclosure on each mediating investor perception.17 For
Hypothesis 3b and Hypothesis 4b, Table 2, Panel C indicates that all the
indirect eﬀects of pay ratio disclosure on perceived investment potential
via each mediating investor perception are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
whether the pay ratio/CEO pay is higher-than-industry or comparable-to-
industry (both conﬁdence intervals include zero in the interval). There is
no evidence to support our hypotheses that the eﬀects of incremental pay
ratio disclosure on perceived CEO pay fairness and perceived workplace
climate, and the associated indirect eﬀects on perceived investment po-
tential, are moderated by whether the pay ratio is higher-than-industry or
comparable-to-industry.
Given the results for moderated mediation in Table 2, we remove all
interaction eﬀects and use a mediation model to test the indirect eﬀects
of pay ratio disclosure, while still controlling for whether the pay ratio/
CEO pay is comparable-to-industry or higher-than-industry. Table 3
reports our analyses. In Table 3, Panel A, the eﬀects of pay ratio dis-
closure on perceived CEO pay fairness in Hypothesis 1a (one-tailed
p = 0.010) and perceived workplace climate in Hypothesis 2a (one-
tailed p = 0.021) are supported. In Table 3, Panel B, the signiﬁcant and
positive eﬀects of perceived CEO pay fairness (one-tailed p = 0.014)
and perceived workplace climate (one-tailed p = 0.007) on perceived
investment potential are consistent with those reported in KS. In
Table 3, Panel C, we ﬁnd support for the indirect negative eﬀects of pay
ratio disclosure on perceived investment potential via perceived CEO
pay fairness (Hypothesis 3a, indirect eﬀect Path a1*Path b1 =−0.25,
conﬁdence interval of −0.72 to −0.03 excludes zero, Sobel test p
value = 0.060) and via perceived workplace climate (Hypothesis 4a,
indirect eﬀect Path a2*Path b2 =−0.24, conﬁdence interval of−0.75
to −0.01 excludes zero, Sobel test p value = 0.064).18
5. Conclusion
Our study contributes to the limited extant literature on pay ratio
disclosure and its eﬀects (e.g., Bu et al., 2016; Kelly and Seow, 2016;
Faleye et al., 2013; Shin et al., 2015). Our experiment ﬁnds that
Table 3
Mediation Analyses (Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes Approach) for Pay Ratio Disclosurea (N = 79b).
Panel A: Regressions of the eﬀect of pay ratio disclosure (versus no pay ratio disclosure) on each mediator (Path a1 and Path a2)
Dependent Variable Predicted sign Coeﬃcient estimate t pc 95% lower conﬁdence
interval
95% upper conﬁdence
interval
CEO pay fairness
Intercept 0.67 1.13 0.263 −0.51 1.85
Pay ratio (vs no pay ratio)d H1a: − −1.58 −2.37 0.010* −2.91 −0.25
Higher-than-industry (vs comparable-to-industry)
CEO payd
– −0.90 −1.35 0.183 −2.22 0.43
R2 = 8.81%
Workplace climate
Intercept 1.76 3.49 < 0.001 0.76 2.77
Pay ratio (vs no pay ratio)d H2a: − −1.18 −2.07 0.021* −2.31 −0.05
Higher-than-industry (vs comparable-to-industry)
CEO payd
– 0.21 0.37 0.710 −0.92 1.34
R2 = 5.54%
Panel B: Regression of the eﬀects of mediators on perceived investment potential (Path b1 and Path b2)
Mediators as independent variables Predicted sign Coeﬃcient estimate t pc 95% lower conﬁdence
interval
95% upper conﬁdence
interval
Intercept 2.85 7.43 <0.001 2.09 3.62
CEO pay fairness + (per KS) 0.16 2.23 0.014* 0.02 0.29
Workplace climate + (per KS) 0.20 2.50 0.007* 0.04 0.37
Pay ratio (vs no pay ratio) Path c’ 0.31 0.74 0.464 −0.53 1.15
Higher-than-industry (vs comparable-to-industry)
CEO pay
Path c’ 0.25 0.62 0.540 −0.56 1.05
R2 = 15.48%
Panel C: Indirect eﬀects of pay ratio disclosure (versus no pay ratio disclosure) on perceived investment potential through mediators (Path a1*Path b1 and Path a2*Path b2)
Sobel test 95% Conﬁdence Interval Limitse
Mediator Indirect eﬀect Path a coeﬃcient*Path b coeﬃcient SE Z p Boot SE Lower Upper
H3a: CEO pay fairness −1.58*0.16 =−0.25 0.16 −1.55 0.060* 0.16 −0.72 −0.03
H4a: Workplace climate −1.18*0.20 =−0.24 0.16 −1.52 0.064* 0.18 −0.75 −0.01
a See Table 1 for deﬁnitions of participant perception variables (perceived CEO pay fairness, workplace climate, and investment potential).
b Of the 81 observations that passed the manipulation checks, two are dropped from the mediation analysis because there are missing values for the perceived workplace climate
variable.
c All p-values are one-tailed for hypothesized relationships and indicated with *. All other p values are two-tailed.
d The pay ratio variable is coded “1” for RATIOPresent and “0” for RATIOAbsent. The higher-than-industry CEO pay variable is coded “1” for HighCEO and “0” for CompCEO.
e Percentile bootstrap conﬁdence intervals are based on 5000 bootstrap samples.
17 Table 2, Panel B indicates that the moderator variable (two-tailed p = 0.161) and
the interaction eﬀect between the moderator variable and pay ratio disclosure (two-tailed
p = 0.180) are not signiﬁcant in the regression used to generate the Path b coeﬃcients
for the eﬀects of each mediating investor perception and the Path c’ coeﬃcient for the
direct eﬀect of the pay ratio disclosure on perceived investment potential.
18 Using the full sample that includes participants who fail the manipulation checks,
the inferences from our results for the mediation model tested in Table 3 are largely
similar (n = 100), except that the indirect eﬀect via perceived CEO pay fairness is not
signiﬁcant using the conﬁdence interval test (H3a, indirect eﬀect =−0.18, conﬁdence
interval of−0.52–0.003 includes zero) but it is marginally signiﬁcant using the Sobel test
(p value = 0.082).
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incremental pay ratio disclosure in a company has signiﬁcant negative
indirect eﬀects on perceived investment potential via perceived CEO
pay fairness and perceived workplace climate, consistent with KS.
However, we ﬁnd no evidence that these eﬀects of incremental pay
ratio disclosure are moderated by whether the pay ratio is comparable-
to-industry or higher-than-industry. To the extent that companies are
concerned about curbing negative perceptions of their compensation
practices and their investment potential, regulation on pay ratio dis-
closures may be eﬀective in restraining excessive CEO pay. Further-
more, our results suggest that the need to manage investor perception
applies not only when companies disclose pay ratios that are higher
than industry norms, but also when pay ratios are in line with industry
norms.
Our study is subject to the limitations of using an experiment. Our
ﬁndings notwithstanding, investor responses to pay ratio disclosures
may diﬀer across other industries, varying ﬁnancial performance, and
investors with varying sensitivity to inequity in compensation practices.
As more data on diﬀerent industries and diﬀerent pay ratio levels be-
come available in the near future, future research would beneﬁt from
cross validation using diﬀerent research methodologies.
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